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False Data Injection Attacks Against
Synchronization Systems in Microgrids
Amr S. Mohamed, Mohammadreza F. M. Arani, Member, IEEE, Amir Abiri Jahromi, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Deepa Kundur, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Synchronization systems play a vital role in the
day-to-day operation of power systems and their restoration
after cascading failures. Hence, their resilience to cyberattacks
is imperative. In this paper, we demonstrate that a well-planned
false data injection attack against the synchronization system of
a generator is capable of causing tripping subsequently leading
to instability and blackout. We present an analytical framework
behind the design and implementation of the proposed cyberat-
tack. Moreover, we derive and discuss the conditions for which
a cyberattack interfering with a synchronizing signal can be
successful. Effective physical mitigation strategies are then pro-
posed to improve the cyber-resilience of synchronization systems.
The proposed cyberattack model and mitigation strategies are
verified for a microgrid test system using an OPAL-RT real-time
simulator.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems, resilience, cyberattack,
power system restoration, synchronization systems, microgrids.
I. INTRODUCTION
C
ONCERNS about the cybersecurity of power systems
have been on the rise in recent years particularly fol-
lowing the cyberattacks against the Ukrainian electricity in-
frastructure [1]–[3]. The North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) has taken initial steps towards addressing
these concerns by mandating the critical infrastructure protec-
tion (CIP) standards. The CIP standards require the identifi-
cation, categorization and protection of cyber assets that are
essential to the reliable operation of the bulk electric system
[4]. Yet, one of the main challenges facing the cybersecurity
of power systems is their scale and complexity as well as
their extensive reliance on information and communication
technologies [5].
The cybersecurity of power systems control has been ex-
amined extensively in recent years at the generation, trans-
mission and distribution levels [6]. Yet, most of the literature
on the cybersecurity of generation control loops has been
focused on automatic generation control (AGC) [7]–[9]. This
is mainly because AGC relies on supervisory control and data
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acquisition (SCADA) systems. In contrast, the cybersecurity
of automatic voltage regulation, governor and synchronization
control has received little attention since they commonly rely
on local control loops. Resilient synchrony of microgrids is
another topic that has gained attention in recent years [10]–
[14]. These papers are mostly focused on cyberattacks against
the secondary frequency control of inverter-based microgrids
during continuous islanded operation mode. These papers do
not investigate the resilience of the reconnection process of
islanded microgrids and the synchronization system used for
this purpose which is investigated in this paper.
Synchronization systems play a vital role in the day-to-
day operation of power systems as well as their restoration
after cascading failures [15]. These systems have traditionally
been used for bringing baseload, peaking or standby gen-
erators online and connecting them to the grid, as well as
reconnecting two synchronous systems during black start or
after system separation following a disturbance [16], [17].
Today, synchronization systems play additional roles such as
connecting islanded microgrids to the main grid [18]–[20].
Synchronization systems bring the voltage, frequency, and
phase angle differences between two spinning systems into
tolerable thresholds before safely connecting them by clos-
ing the interconnecting circuit breaker (CB) [21], [22]. The
synchronization system essentially adjusts the frequency and
voltage of the spinning systems by sending control commands
to the governor and exciter of a generator or a set of generators
[23], [24] and can be managed manually by the system
operator, by using auto-synchronization systems, or through
some combination of both [16].
Correct synchronization is critical to prevent damage to
generators or disturbance when connecting two or more power
systems [25]. As such, synchronization systems typically
include multiple levels of supervision including an auto-
matic synchronization controller (ASC) and a human operator
overseeing it. Synchronism-check and voltage relays may be
employed as additional levels of supervision to prevent an
interconnecting CB from closing during faulty synchronization
conditions [26]–[28]. This is while no supervision exists on
the synchronizing signal communicated from the ASC to the
generator exciter and governor. Traditionally, the integrity of
the synchronizing signal has not been of concern due to the
absence of remote access to the synchronization system and
the reliance on hardwired communication of signals from the
synchronization panel to the control systems of the governor,
exciter and interconnecting CB [28].
This characteristic has been changing rapidly in recent years
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due to the need for improved reliability, reduced installation
costs, as well as the movement toward automation and remote
synchronization, particularly in the case of microgrids [28]–
[30]. Emerging synchronization systems provide remote access
features and employ open data transmission protocols on fiber-
optic or Ethernet based communication to send correction
pulses to the generator governor and exciter to automatically
adjust the frequency and voltage during synchronization [31],
[32]. A cyberattacker may infiltrate such a system more easily
and proceed to install malware on the ASC, or access the
communication channel of the synchronization system by
adding a new malicious communication device. Subsequently,
the cyberattacker can send corrupted control commands to the
generator governor or exciter to cause a generator trip, stability
problems and/or a potential blackout.
The impact of attacks targeting automatic synchronization
systems has been recently studied by Kandasamy in [33].
It is demonstrated in [33] that cyberattacks can delay the
synchronization of a generator indefinitely. This paper expands
on the work presented in [33] by considering how FDI
attacks against synchronization systems can be executed in
the context of microgrids. In this paper, we study a FDI
attack model targeting automatic synchronization systems in
microgrids which not only hinders the synchronization, but can
also directly trip a generator potentially leading to microgrid
blackout.
We present the analytical framework behind the design and
implementation of the cyberattack. Sensitivity analyses of sys-
tem parameters and how they may influence the success of the
cyberattack are further performed and presented. Afterwards,
we propose two physical mitigation strategies to enhance the
cyber-resilience of synchronization systems.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• For the first time, we investigate cyberattacks interfering
with the microgrid synchronization process. We discuss
how emerging synchronization systems in microgrids
enable cyber vulnerabilities which allow a skilled attacker
to execute FDI attacks with severe consequences. We
demonstrate that the attacker is able to exploit system res-
onance and influence the microgrid frequency to rapidly
trip a generator which may potentially lead to microgrid
blackout.
• We present an analytical framework for designing novel
attacks against synchronization systems. The framework
incorporates understanding of the operation of industrial
ASC devices and theoretical analysis of synchronization
control. The framework highlights the threats of periodic
FDI attacks, and yields success conditions for the attacks
and design guidelines for the FDI attack signal. The
framework also identifies the fastest attack for tripping
a generator by attacking its synchronization system.
• We develop and implement two physical mitigation strate-
gies to prevent the success of the attacks. Based on
theoretical analysis of synchronization control, we de-
rive equations to calculate the threshold for an anomaly
detection based strategy, and the saturation value for a
limiter-block based strategy.
We validate the FDI attacks and mitigation strategies via
real-time simulations using a detailed microgrid model on
OPAL-RT HyperSim simulator.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the attack model against synchronization
systems. The analytical framework is established in Section III
for designing a successful cyberattack. Moreover, sensitivity
analyses are performed to examine how variations in the
system parameters may affect the success of the attack against
synchronization systems. In Section IV, the mitigation strate-
gies are developed and their impact on synchronization process
is assessed. Section V details empirical testing and verification
of the proposed mitigation strategies on a microgrid test
system using an OPAL-RT real-time simulator. We provide
the concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. ATTACK MODEL
Despite the massive integration of inverter-interfaced dis-
tributed energy resources (DERs) such as wind and solar,
synchronous generators continue to play the key role in the
synchronization of bulk power systems and microgrids. This
paper investigates the cybersecurity of the synchronization sys-
tems of synchronous generators in microgrids. Nevertheless,
the findings are applicable more generally to the cybersecurity
of generator synchronization in bulk power systems.
Fig. 1 illustrates the schematic representation of cyberat-
tacks against the synchronization system of a microgrid. At
the point of common coupling (PCC) of the microgrid and
the main grid, an ASC monitors the voltage of the microgrid
and the main grid and sends control signals to the governor
of the synchronizing generator to adjust the frequency of the
microgrid to the main grid by means of digital I/O pulses
(e.g. ABB SYNCHROTACT [34]) or by interrogated contacts
(e.g. SEL A25A [35]). To model the control signals, (+1) and
(-1) pulses are considered when commanding the generator
to respectively ramp up and down, and (0) is considered in
the absence of control command or when communication is
lost. The control signals are communicated over the microgrid
network to the governor of the synchronizing generator.
Fig. 2 illustrates the signals and measurements which are in-
volved in the synchronization of the microgrid. Voltage trans-
formers are used to obtain local measurements of the voltage
of the main-grid (VGrid−side) and microgrid (VMicrogrid−side)
at the PCC, and the circuit breaker at the PCC is closed when
the voltage profiles are sufficiently close and synchronization
criteria are met. The synchronization control signal ωcp is
communicated from the PCC local-area network (LAN) to
the synchronizing generator LAN over the microgrid network
typically using IEC61850 protocol. The synchronizing signal
communication is illustrated in Fig. 3.
The objective of the attack is to trip the synchronizing
generator by sending falsified synchronization control signals
to the generator governor. Fig. 2 illustrates the protective relays
of the generator including under-frequency (UF) (ANSI 81U),
over-frequency (OF) (81O), and rate-of-change-of-frequency
(ROCOF) (81R). To achieve the goal of the attack, the falsified




















Fig. 1. Schematic representation of cyberattacks against the synchronization















Fig. 2. Automatic synchronization control of a synchronous generator in a
microgrid
Two attack models are considered in this paper. The first
attack model is based on programmable logic controller root-
kit attacks as discussed in [33]. The adaptation of this attack
model to our work is illustrated by the dashed red arrows (1)
and (2a) in Fig. 3. Arrow (1) represents the attacker gaining
remote access to the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) at the
PCC LAN. The reprogramming of the ASC via a rootkit attack
is represented by arrow (2a). The second attack model takes
advantage of the microgid communication network. The route
of the synchronizing signal in the microgrid communication
network is traced with solid red arrows from the ASC to
the synchronizing generator governor in Fig. 3. This attack
model exploits the vulnerabilities in the IEC 61850 protocol to
capture and modify, or fabricate false signals, as discussed in
[36], [37]. This attack is feasible due to lack of communication
encryption. This approach is represented by (2b) in Fig. 3. It
is worth noting that, in contrast to [33], the attacker does not
need to spoof the HMI available to the system operator to
hide suspicious activities. This is because the attack models
considered in this paper can be executed very fast to prevent
any corrective actions by the operator to thwart the attack.
We discuss in Section III how knowledge of the resonance
frequency of the system can enable the attacker to achieve
this goal.























Fig. 4. Synchronous generator block diagram.
Fig. 5. The block diagram of the transfer functions involved in attacks against
synchronization systems.
Tripping the synchronizing generator can have significant
impacts as the loss of generation in the microgrid which
can result in microgrid blackout. Exploring the potential of
cyberattacks on synchronization systems requires a study of
synchronous generator control and protection subsystems as
detailed in the next section.
III. ANALYTICAL MODEL
This section presents the underlying analytical framework
for designing cyberattacks against synchronization systems.
We begin by describing the typical control architecture of a
synchronous generator. The conditions for the successful im-
plementation of a cyberattack against synchronization systems
are subsequently derived and discussed.
A. Modeling of the Synchronization System of a Synchronous
Generator
The typical small-signal block diagram of the control system
of a synchronous generator is shown in Figure 3 [38]. The
synchronous generator is modeled by a rotating mass driven
by a combustion engine such as a gas turbine or a reciprocating
diesel engine. The combustion engine is controlled by several
control loops including speed-droop governor, automatic gen-
eration control (AGC) and ASC. The equations governing the















(∆Pref − kd∆ω) (2)
∆Ṗref = kc(u−∆ω) (3)
where ∆ denotes deviation from the point of linearization,
Pfuel represents the fuel intake of the synchronous generator,
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Fig. 6. Microgrid test system with the synchronous generator DG2 in charge
of synchronization with the main grid.
Pref denotes the AGC load reference, u is the time integral of
the ASC synchronizing signal, ω denotes the system frequency,
and τ and k denote the time-constants and gains in different
control loops, respectively. Subscripts T and G refer to the
prime-mover and governor, respectively.
The frequency at the synchronous generator bus is governed







(∆PG −∆PV SI −∆PL) (4)
where M and D denote the inertia and load damping con-
stants, PG represents the output of the synchronous generator,
PV SI is the power output of voltage source inverter (VSI)
interfaced DERs which provide frequency regulation, and PL
denotes the demand.
The state space representation of Equations (1)-(4) is given
in (5):
ẋg = Agxg +B1gu+B2g∆PL +B3g∆PV SI (5)
where the state vector is
xg = [∆Pref ∆Pfuel ∆PG ∆ω]
T
Ag represents the state matrix, and B1g , B2g and B3g denote
input matrices. The matrices are defined in the Appendix.
To investigate the possibility of tripping a synchronous
generator using the synchronization signal, we model syn-
chronous generator control and protection subsystems. The
transfer function G(s) relating the input signal u in Fig. 5





= [0 0 0 1] (sI −Ag)
−1B1g (6)
Fig. 5 illustrates the subsystems relevant to the study of
cyberattacks against the synchronization system. As illustrated
in Fig. 5, the falsified synchronization signal passes through
an integrator block which transforms it into signal u before
entering the block with transfer function G(s). In Fig. 5,
the frequency deviation is denoted by ∆ω, the measured
frequency deviation is denoted by ν
UF/OF
, and the measured
rate of change of frequency is denoted by ν
ROCOF
. The
under-frequency/over-frequency and ROCOF relays respec-
tively are denoted by the subscripts UF/OF and ROCOF. The
objective of the attacker is to trigger one of the ROCOF or
under-frequency/over-frequency relays to trip the generator. To
achieve this objective, the signal u has to be manipulated such
that one of the relay measurements exceeds its corresponding
relay setting.
B. Frequency Analysis of the Synchronization System
Considering the transfer functions of the under-
frequency/over-frequency and ROCOF protective relays in























combination with the transfer function G(s), we respectively





as illustrated in Fig. 5. These transfer functions relate the
signal u directly to the frequency relay measurements. We
restate that the objective of the attacker is to manipulate
the signal u to trip the synchronous generator, and that the
tripping is dictated by the frequency relays based on the relay
measurements.
For demonstration purposes, we consider the data of the
synchronous generator DG2 in the microgrid test system
shown in Fig. 6. The test system data is provided in the
Appendix.





(s) for the synchronous generator DG2 which are
shown in Fig. 7. The transfer function J
UF/OF
(s), represented
by the dashed red curve in Fig. 7, exhibits a low pass behavior
with a low crossover frequency which is in accordance with
synchronous generators typically showing a slow dynamic
response behaviour. Therefore, any attack targeting the under-
frequency/over-frequency relay will require a long attack du-
ration and, hence, can be easily detected and mitigated.
In contrast, the transfer function J
ROCOF
(s), represented by
the blue solid curve in Fig. 7, exhibits a band-pass behavior.
A periodic signal u with a frequency inside this band-pass can
be used to trigger the ROCOF relay. The band-pass, as shown
in Fig. 7, is at a relatively high frequency range in comparison
with the J
UF/OF
(s) case, which enables the periodic attack to
be designed with higher frequencies and for the attacks to be
executed faster.
Another important observation in Fig. 7 is the resonance
frequency which occurs at ω = 3.60 rad/s. As synchronous
generators are more vulnerable to high oscillations at their
resonance frequencies, information about the resonance fre-
quency can be used by a cyberattacker to design a fast attack.
The implications of this will be investigated further in the next
subsection.
C. Conditions for Successful Attacks
Now, we explore the characteristics of the synchronizing
signal to derive the conditions for a successful cyberattack.
Industrial ASC devices offer a range of options to tailor
the synchronization process to the requirements of generation
plants. These options include the ability to choose between
a fixed or proportional frequency mode to specify the width
of each correction pulse, and the pulse interval defining the
time between the rising edges of consecutive correction pulses
in the synchronizing signal [34], [35]. The synchronizing
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signal consists of a stream of (+1) and (-1) pulses. Therefore,
the attacker should devise a similar pattern to make the
attack signal unrecognizable from the synchronizing signal by
operators.
We posit that it is possible to ignore the harmonic fre-





(s). Therefore, the at-
tack signal u
attack
can be approximated with a pure sinusoidal
signal with a fundamental frequency ω
attack
while deriving the
conditions for a successful attack without loss of generality.




in Fig. 5 are also





can be calculated as given in (7)-(8) for





























where the magnitude of the transfer function J(s) at the
attack frequency ω
attack













∣ respectively for ROCOF and under-
frequency/over-frequency relays.




should violate the setting of the corresponding
protective relay for the attack to be successful. This means that
either the peak value of ν
ROCOF
should exceed the ROCOF
relay setting, R, i.e., ν
pk
ROCOF
≥ R or the peak value of ν
UF/OF
should exceed one of the under-frequency/over-frequency relay




the conditions for successful attacks can be derived from (7)-




































It is worth noting that the required peak values of
the signal u
attack
for triggering the ROCOF and under-
frequency/over-frequency protective relays are dictated by the









)) and the settings of the protective relays









)| occurs at the resonance frequency. This
underscores the importance of the resonance frequency while
devising an attack against the synchronization system of a
synchronous generator.
The ROCOF and under-frequency/over-frequency protective
relays can be triggered through the synchronizing signal only if
the peak value of the signal u
attack
can satisfy the conditions in
(9)-(10). Thus, we need to investigate the maximum realizable
peak value of the signal u
attack
in order to determine the
feasibility of implementing a successful attack. As discussed
previously, ASC control signal consists of a stream of (+1)
and (-1) pulses. The maximum peak value of the fundamental
component of the signal u occurs when the synchronizing
signal is a square wave with only (+1) and (-1) amplitudes.
The integrator ks/s in Fig. 5 transforms the square wave signal















R = 0.05 pu








implementation of an attack using falsified synchronizing signals.
with only (+1) and (-1) amplitudes to a triangular signal. The



















4ks/πωattack as indicated in (11), is a function of the
integrator gain ks and the frequency of the attack signal
ω
attack
. As such, the only parameter that can be controlled
by the attacker in (9)-(11) to implement a successful attack





of the falsified synchronizing signal. This is again because









R, UF , OF and ks, are dictated by the characteristics of
the synchronous generator and the settings of the protective
relays.
The ultimate conditions for implementing a successful at-
tack against the synchronization system are given in (12)-(13).
The conditions indicate that the attack is feasible only when
the maximum achievable peak value of the signal u
attack
is
larger than one of the minimum values required to trigger a























The data of the synchronous generator DG2 is used again
here to demonstrate the attack conditions. The required peak
value of the signal u
pk
attack
for triggering the ROCOF and
under-frequency/over-frequency protective relays of the syn-
chronous generator DG2 are illustrated in Fig. 8 as functions of
T
attack




peak value of the signal u
pk
attack
for triggering the ROCOF
relay with a setting of R = 0.05 pu is illustrated by the curve




triggering the under-frequency/over-frequency protective relay
with a setting of min{UF,OF} = 0.03 pu is illustrated by the
curve in black. The relay settings are adopted from IEEE Std.
1547 [39] and provided in the Appendix. The green and black
curves move up (down) as the corresponding relay setting is
set to larger (smaller) values.
The curve in red in Fig. 8 shows the maximum achievable
peak value of the signal u
attack
as a function of T
attack
.





approximately equal to 1.73 seconds. This time period corre-
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sponds to the resonance frequency of the synchronous gener-
ator which is equal to 3.6 rad/s.
As illustrated in Fig. 8, the attacker can successfully trigger
the protective relays of a synchronous generator by manipu-
lating the time period of the falsified synchronizing signal to
the governor. The protective relay is triggered by the falsified
synchronizing signal when the red curve is above the curve
associated with the protective relay. For instance, the ROCOF
relay with the setting of 0.05 pu can be triggered by the
falsified synchronizing signals with time periods larger than
1.52 seconds. Moreover, the under-frequency/over-frequency
relay can be triggered by falsified synchronizing signals with
time periods larger than 3.15 seconds. Falsified synchronizing
signals with time periods larger than 3.15 seconds may trigger
both relays. Yet, the ROCOF relay still may be triggered first
considering the slow behavior of J
UF/OF
(s) for the under-
frequency/over-frequency relay. Fig. 8 illustrates the vulner-
ability of the synchronization systems of the synchronous
generator DG2 as well as the conditions for implementing a
successful attack which is one of the main objectives of the
present paper.
The observations in Fig. 8 are consistent with the ob-
servations in Fig. 7. As illustrated in Fig. 8 the under-
frequency/over-frequency relay can be triggered by falsified
synchronizing signals with time periods larger than 3.15 sec-
onds. This range verifies the low-pass behavior of the under-
frequency/over-frequency relay. Similarly, Fig. 8 verifies the
band-pass behavior of the ROCOF relay considering that the
falsified synchronizing signals with time periods less than 1.52
seconds would not trigger the ROCOF relay.
The remaining question to be answered is the accessibility
of the required information for devising a successful attack to
the attacker. The settings of the generator protective relays
can be gathered from various standards and manufacturer
manuals. The data about the generator transfer function G(s)
can be estimated using the approach presented in [40] by
eavesdropping the system frequency ∆ω during the system
disturbances or by active probing. The attacker can also obtain
information about the resonance frequency of the synchronous
generator by passively monitoring the frequency response of
the system during disturbances.
It is worth noting that the attacker does not necessarily need
the aforementioned information to implement a successful
attack. This is because, the attack success can be guaranteed by
increasing the time period of the falsified synchronizing signal.
Referring back to Fig. 8, this strategy can be visually explained




time periods where the curve ascends above the green or black
curves; at which point, the frequency protective relays can be
triggered.
D. Modeling of the Synchronization System of a Microgrid
The proposed analytical model for the synchronization sys-
tem of a synchronous generator is extended here to microgrids.
Inverter-interfaced DERs like storage, wind and solar do not
commonly contribute to frequency regulation in traditional

























implementation of an attack considering the contribution of the inverter-
interfaced DERs.
microgrids in which inverter-interfaced DERs do not con-
tribute to frequency regulation is similar to the modeling
presented previously for a synchronous generator. Yet, there
have been several initiatives in academia and industry in recent
years to realize frequency regulation using inverter-interfaced
DERs in microgrids. As such, we examine the impact of these
resources on the attacks against the synchronization system of
a microgrid.
The transfer function of an inverter-interfaced distributed
energy resource in droop control and virtual inertia mode are









The microgrid test system in Fig. 6 is employed for the




for triggering the ROCOF protective relay of the syn-
chronous generator DG2 is illustrated in Fig. 9 as a function
of the maximum power output of inverter-interfaced DERs,
∆PmaxV SI . The setting of the ROCOF protective relay R and
the time period of the attack signal T
attack
are respectively
considered to be 0.05 pu and 2 seconds.
As illustrated in Fig. 9, the increase in ∆PmaxV SI due to the




to trigger the ROCOF protective relay. The same
trend exists for the under-frequency/over-frequency relay in
the presence of droop control and virtual inertia from inverter-
interfaced DERs. This indicates that it is more difficult to
implement a successful attack against synchronization systems
when interconnecting two systems with high inertia and fre-
quency regulating mechanisms compared to interconnecting
a weak grid with low inertia and weak frequency regulating
mechanism like a microgrid to the main grid.
E. Sensitivity Analyses
Sensitivity analyses are performed in this section to show
that the attacks are applicable to systems with a wide range
of control system parameters. Specifically, we demonstrate
the impact of varying the parameters in the transfer function
J
ROCOF
(s) such as AGC and droop gains on the required peak
value of the signal u
attack
to trigger the ROCOF protective
relay. Moreover, the impact of the AGC and droop gains on the
performance of the control loops of the synchronous generator
is discussed.
Fig. 10 illustrates the impact of varying the AGC gain kc


























 = 2 s
T
attack
 = 3 s
T
attack
 = 4 s


















Fig. 10. Sensitivity analysis; (a) u
pk,R
attack
versus the AGC gain kc, (b) Loci
of the eigenvalues of the mechanical mode when kc is changed from 0.5 to
5 with steps of 0.5. The increase is to the right.
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Fig. 11. Sensitivity analysis; (a) u
pk,R
attack
versus the droop gain kd, (b) Loci
of the eigenvalues of the mechanical mode when kd is changed from 10 to
80 with steps of 10. The increase is to the right.
ROCOF relay and the performance of AGC. It can be observed
in Fig. 10 (a) that decreasing the AGC gain increases the
required peak value u
pk,R
attack
. Fig. 10 (b) illustrates the impact
of varying the AGC gain from 0.5 to 5 on the location of
the dominant mechanical eigenmode of the system transfer
function G(s). The red points in Fig. 10 (b) show the low
values of the AGC gain for which the attack is infeasible.




, these values are impractical as they also
diminish the performance of AGC.
Fig. 11 illustrates the impact of varying the droop gain kd
on the required peak value of the signal u
attack
to trigger the
ROCOF relay and the performance of frequency-droop control.
It can be observed in Fig. 11 (a) that increasing the droop gain
increases the required peak value u
pk,R
attack
. Although the large




to trigger the ROCOF relay, these values also decrease
the internal stability of the system. This is illustrated by Fig. 11
(b) which shows the impact of varying the droop gain from 10
to 80 on the location of the dominant mechanical eigenmode
of the system transfer function G(s). Increasing the droop gain
would eventually destabilize the system by moving the poles
of G(s) outside the stable left-half plane.
Thus, the attacks are applicable to systems with the consid-
ered values of AGC and droop gain, and when not, the gain
values themselves are impractical for the system.
A similar sensitivity analysis as the one presented here can
be performed to demonstrate the impact of the parameters in
the transfer function J
UF/OF
(s) on the required peak value
of the signal u to trigger the under-frequency/over-frequency
relay; the results of this sensitivity analysis are not provided
for the sake of brevity.
IV. MITIGATION STRATEGY
Cyber and physical solutions can be used to mitigate the
cyberattacks against synchronization systems. Cyber solutions
either rely on the protection of cyber assets from intrusion or
rely on encryption of data. This is while physical solutions
entail physical modifications of the system. The deficiency
of the cyber solutions is that skilled attackers with sufficient
resources may still compromise the security measures. Here,
we propose two physical mitigation strategies as the last
line of defense against cyberattacks targeting synchronization
systems. The first mitigation strategy is based on an anomaly
detection system. The second mitigation strategy is based on
incorporating a limiter block in the governor control logic of
the synchronizing generator. We also verify that the mitigation
strategies do not interfere with the normal synchronization
process.
A. Anomaly Detection Based Mitigation Strategy
The generator frequency during a successful cyberattack has
to change faster than during normal synchronization to prevent
attack detection by operators. Hence, we propose an anomaly
detection based mitigation strategy capable of detecting attacks
by monitoring the rate-of-change of frequency of the system.
The following equation can be used to identify anomalies and
disable synchronization while alarming the operators.
1 (ν > ΛA) (16)
where 1(·) is a function equal to 1 when the condition inside
the brackets is true, indicating the presence of an anomaly,
and 0 otherwise. ν indicates the rate-of-change of frequency
which can be obtained by simple processing of the voltage
measurements. The threshold ΛA can be derived via theoretical
analysis of the small-signal model presented in Section III or
statistical analysis of system historical data.
Here, we use small-signal model to derive ΛA. Let Γ denote
the width of a normal synchronizing signal correction pulse.
If the ASC is set to fixed frequency mode then the value
of Γ will be fixed as discussed in Section III-C. If the
ASC is in proportional frequency mode, then we will set
Γ equal to the maximum pulse width. This pulse enters the
integrator block ks/s in Fig. 5 resulting in signal u(t). The
signal u(t) increases or decreases linearly with time until it
has seen a change of Γks. The governor control will react
to adjust the frequency of the generator according to the
signal u(t). ΛA can be computed as the maximum rate-of-
change of frequency during a normal synchronization process.
The mitigation strategy resets the integrator block output and
disables the synchronization process when the measured rate-







Fig. 12. Block diagram of the proposed mitigation strategy.












Fig. 13. The signal u(t) with the maximum achievable peak value before
and after using the limiter block.
Using the ROCOF relay measurement for ν, the above ex-














where L−1 is the inverse Laplace transform, and JROCOF (s)
is as introduced in Section III. B.
For example, the value of ΛA for the testbed under study for
a maximum pulse width of 10 milliseconds must be greater
than or equal to 2.5× 10−3 pu.
When an anomaly is detected, an alarm is sent to alert the
operator. Moreover, a local signal is sent to the governor to
disable the synchronization process temporarily until the rate-
of-change of frequency of the system settles back to the normal
range.
It is worth noting that the mitigation strategy relies on local
measurements from voltage transformers to calculate the rate-
of-change of frequency. Therefore, it is more difficult to
compromise it by cyber intrusions.
B. Limiter Block Based Mitigation Strategy
As discussed in Section III. C, the successful implementa-
tion of attacks against synchronization systems depends on
the maximum achievable peak value of the signal u
attack
.
Therefore, the conditions for preventing successful attacks
against synchronization systems can be derived from (12)-(13)























Hence, we propose to add a limiter block in the synchroniza-
tion control loop after the integrator block ks/s as illustrated
in Fig. 12 in order to satisfy the conditions in (18)-(19). The
triangular signal u is considered again here because it results
in the maximum achievable peak value for the signal u as
discussed in Section III. C. The conditions (18)-(19) transform
the triangular signal u to a trapezoidal signal as illustrated in
Fig. 13. The peak value of the fundamental component of
the trapezoidal waveform is given in (20). This peak value is




The saturation value of the limiter to prevent attacks denoted


















attack occur at the resonance frequency. Thus, the
ultimate saturation value of the limiter can be obtained from












where ωr denotes the resonance frequency, and u
pk,min
rep-







Limiting the signal u(t) below the saturation value AL
prevents the success of periodic FDI attacks irrespective of
the pattern of the attack. This mitigation strategy can be easily
extended to other non-periodic FDI attacks such as saturated
ramp and ramp attacks. In saturated ramp and ramp attacks,
the attacker falsifies the synchronization control signal in order
to shape the signal u(t) as saturated ramp and unlimited ramp
signals, respectively. To mitigate these attacks, the saturation
value of the limiter, i.e., ΛB , must be smaller than the
minimum value of AL, as well as the under-frequency/over-
frequency relay settings as given in the following.
ΛB < min{AL, UF,OF} (24)
This mitigation strategy can be implemented via a small
logic modification in the governor control IED. The proposed
mitigation strategy does not have any impact on other control
loops of a synchronous generator since it only modifies the
synchronization control loop.
C. Impact on Normal Synchronization
We demonstrate that the proposed mitigation strategies do
not have a tangible impact on the synchronization process in
the absence of cyberattacks. It is assumed that the microgrid
test system in Fig. 6 starts the synchronization process at
t = 2 seconds when the frequency difference between the
microgrid and the main grid is 0.6 Hz. In the testbed under
study, AL is equal to 0.15. Considering under-frequency
and over-frequency relay settings of 0.058 pu and 0.033 pu,
respectively, we implement a limiter block saturation value
of 0.025 pu which satisfies equation (24). For the anomaly
detection based mitigation strategy, we implement a threshold
value equal to 3× 10−3 pu which satisfies equation (17).
Fig. 14 illustrates the synchronization process for the cases
with and without the mitigation in the absence of cyberattacks.
The curves associated with the cases with and without the
limiter block mitigation strategy are respectively shown in red
and blue. The acceptable ranges of the frequency and phase
angle for closing the PCC circuit breaker are shown by black
dashed lines in Fig. 14 (b) and (c), respectively.
As illustrated in Fig. 14 (d), the rate-of-change of frequency
does not exceed the anomaly detection threshold shown by red
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Fig. 14. Microgrid synchronization with (red) and without (blue) the proposed
limiter block mitigation strategies in the absence of cyberattacks. (a) shows
the signal u. (b) shows the microgrid frequency relative to the frequency of
the main grid. (c) shows the microgrid phase angle relative to the phase angle
of the main grid, (d) shows the microgrid rate-of-change of frequency.
dashed lines. This verifies that the mitigation strategy does not
intervene with the normal synchronization process.
As for the limiter block strategy, the saturation value is
shown by a red dashed line in Fig. 14 (a). The signal u cannot
exceed this limit for the case with the limiter block mitigation
strategy. The case without the mitigation strategy arrives at
the acceptable range for closing the PCC circuit breaker in
approximately 124 seconds. This is while it approximately
takes 159 seconds for the case with the mitigation strategy
to arrive at the acceptable range for closing the PCC circuit
breaker. It can be observed that the results of both cases are
satisfactory. Therefore, we conclude that microgrids would not
bear tangible dynamic or economic consequences due to this
short time delay.
It is noteworthy that both mitigation strategies do not impact
generation frequency control, do not require intensive compu-
tation and do not rely on a cyber system offering a physical
layer of security to improve the cyber-physical resilience of
synchronization systems.
V. REAL-TIME SIMULATION RESULTS
The OPAL-RT real-time simulator is employed to test and
verify the findings of the paper using the detailed model of the
microgrid test system in Fig. 6. The microgrid test system in
Fig. 6 replicates an existing medium-voltage rural distribution
system in Ontario, Canada. Two distributed generators (DG)
are connected to the microgrid. DG1 is a variable speed wind
generator which is connected to the microgrid through a 2.5
MVA full-scale converter. DG2 is a 2.5 MVA synchronous













































Fig. 15. Simulation results using OPAL-RT: An attack with the time period
of the system resonance and a stream of (+1) and (-1) pulses.
generator which is in charge of synchronization process during
the transition form islanded mode of operation to the grid
connection mode of operation. An energy storage system with
a 125 kWh capacity is further connected to the microgrid at
bus 8 which is represented as a controllable load. Naming
conventions are used such that B, T and LP respectively
represent circuit breakers, transformers and loads in Fig. 6.
The microgrid test system data are provided in the Appendix.
The settings of the ROCOF and under-frequency/over-
frequency relays respectively are considered to be equal to
0.05 pu and 0.033 pu in the studies, and are illustrated by
horizontal dashed lines in Figs. 15–21. The ROCOF relay
trips the synchronous generator once the measurement exceeds
the relay setting. Yet, signals are shown after exceeding the
setting of the protective relay for demonstration purposes. The
signals ωcp±, uattack , νROCOF and νUF,OF are demonstrated in
green and black in the case study figures respectively for the
cases with and without implementing the mitigation strategy.
We first validate the limiter block based mitigation strategy
where the saturation value of the limiter block is set to 0.03.
Afterwards, we validate the anomaly detection based strategy.
A. Limiter Block Based Mitigation Strategy
1) Case Study A1: The objective of the first case study
is to demonstrate how fast the ROCOF protective relay of
the synchronous generator in the microgrid test system can
be triggered by attacks against the synchronization system. A
fast attack prevents any corrective action by the operator to
thwart the attack. As such, the time period of the falsified
synchronizing signal is considered to be equal to the time
period of the resonance frequency. Afterwards, the proposed
mitigation strategy is employed to demonstrate its capability
in preventing the attack. As illustrated in Fig. 15, the ROCOF
relay is triggered just after 2 seconds in this study in the
absence of the proposed mitigation strategy.
Yet, this attack results in large fluctuations in the frequency
of the microgrid which is conveniently detectable by the
microgrid operators.
2) Case Study A2: The objective of this case study is
to reduce the microgrid frequency fluctuations observed in
Case Study A1 to make the attack undetectable by operators
10













































Fig. 16. Simulation results using OPAL-RT: An attack with the time period
of the system resonance and a stream of (+1) and (-1) pulses with reduced
duty cycle.













































Fig. 17. Simulation results using OPAL-RT: An attack with time period of
the system resonance and a complex pattern.
monitoring microgrid frequency. To achieve this objective, the
duty cycle of (+1) and (-1) pulses is reduced. This results
in reduced microgrid frequency fluctuations at the expense of
longer time for triggering the ROCOF relay. The ROCOF relay
is triggered in less than 8 seconds in this study in the absence
of the mitigation strategy as illustrated in Fig. 16.
3) Case Study A3: The objective of this study is to
demonstrate that more complex attack patterns can also be
exploited to trigger the ROCOF relay. The time period of the
falsified synchronization signal is considered to correspond to
the resonance frequency. The falsified synchronization signal
is designed to satisfy the attack success conditions in (9)-
(10). Consequently, the ROCOF relay is triggered just after 3
seconds in this study in the absence of the mitigation strategy.
Note that the fastest relay triggering time observed in Case
Study A1 has increased by 150% in this case study. It confirms
the analyses in the previous sections that triangular waveforms,
despite their simplicity, can trigger the relays much faster
compared to other attacks. The simulation results are shown
in Fig. 17.
4) Case Study A4: The objective of this study is to demon-
strate that it is possible to trigger the ROCOF relay by using
the falsified synchronizing signal with time periods different
from the time period of the resonance frequency. Moreover,













































Fig. 18. Simulation results using OPAL-RT: An attack with a time period
different from the time period of the system resonance.













































Fig. 19. Simulation results using OPAL-RT: Saturated ramp attack.
this study verifies that an attacker does not need to have
exact knowledge of the system to implement a successful
attack. The time period of the falsified synchronizing signal
in this study is selected to be different from the time period
of the resonance frequency. The time period of the falsified
synchronizing signal in this study is considered to be 1.52






. The ROCOF relay
is triggered in less than 5 seconds in this study in the absence
of the mitigation strategy as illustrated in Fig. 18.
5) Case Study A5: The objective of this study is to demon-
strate that the mitigation strategy based on the limiter block
is capable of preventing non-periodic FDI attacks. In Fig.
19, we consider a saturated ramp attack. In this attack, the
attacker’s aim is to inject a falsified synchronization signal to
raise the frequency of the generator beyond the relay setting
of the over-frequency relay. Fig. 19 shows that this attack is
able to trip the generator in approximately 6 seconds in the
absence of the proposed mitigation strategy. The mitigation
strategy successfully prevents the frequency from exceeding
the over-frequency relay setting. Unlike the periodic attacks,
the rate-of-change of frequency deviation is small and cannot
trigger the ROCOF relay. The attack also takes a relatively
longer time to trip a generator as compared to the periodic
attack in Case Study A1.
11









































Fig. 20. Simulation results using OPAL-RT: Periodic attack with the anomaly
detection based mitigation strategy.
B. Anomaly Detection Based Mitigation Strategy
The threshold value for the anomaly detection mitigation
strategy is set to be equal to 3 × 10−3 pu. This threshold
is shown with horizontal dashed blue lines in Figs. 20–21.
When ν
ROCOF
exceeds this threshold, an anomaly is detected
and a local signal is sent to the governor to disable the
synchronization process temporarily until the rate-of-change
of frequency of the system settles back to the normal range.
For the system under study, the synchronization is re-enabled
when ν
ROCOF
has stayed below the threshold for 3 seconds.
1) Case Study B1: In this case study, we reconsider the
attack in Case Study A1 which has the shortest success
time. Fig. 20 shows that the mitigation strategy disables the
synchronizing signal in less than 1 second after the attack
starts. Synchronization is re-enabled approximately after 8
seconds but promptly disabled again due to the detection of
anomaly. Similar results are observed in the other periodic
attack patterns. The simulation results obtained for the other
periodic attacks are not provided here for the sake of brevity.
2) Case Study B2: In this case study, we consider a ramp
attack to demonstrate that the anomaly detection mitigation
strategy is capable of preventing non-periodic FDI attacks.
Fig. 21 shows that the ramp attack is able to trip the generator
in less than 6 seconds in the absence of the mitigation strategy.
Yet, the mitigation strategy successfully prevents the attack.
The simulation results in Case Study A1-A5 and B1-B2
demonstrate that the proposed mitigation strategies success-
fully prevent all presented FDI attacks. This is evidenced
by the measurements shown in green not exceeding their
corresponding relay settings in Figs. 15–21.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented an analytical framework for deriving
conditions for the successful implementation of FDI cyber-
attacks against the synchronization systems of synchronous
generators in microgrids. We show that an attacker can im-
plement a fast successful attack by manipulating the time
period of the synchronizing control signal to the governor of
a synchronous generator. Moreover, we demonstrate that the
time period associated with the resonance frequency of the
targeted system results in the fastest attack. Yet, the attacker









































Fig. 21. Simulation results using OPAL-RT: Ramp attack with the anomaly
detection based mitigation strategy.
does not need to have exact knowledge of the resonance
frequency to implement a successful attack.
The proposed analytical framework is further employed to
devise effective physical mitigation strategies, one of which
is based on incorporating a limiter into the synchronization
control loop, and the other is based on detecting anomalies
in the power system rate-of-change of frequency during the
synchronization process. It is determined that the proposed
mitigation strategies do not have a tangible impact on the syn-
chronization process in the absence of cyberattacks. Moreover,
the proposed mitigation strategies do not interfere with other
control loops of the synchronous generator.
Lastly, sensitivity analyses are performed to explore the
impact that parameters such as AGC and droop gains of a
synchronous generator have on the successful implementation
of the attack. The impact of the inverter-based DERs is further
investigated for the successful implementation of cyberattacks
against synchronization systems in microgrids. The simulation
results illustrate that inverter-based DERs, whether operated in
virtual inertia or droop control mode, make it more difficult
to implement a successful attack against the synchronization
system of a microgrid.
APPENDIX
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LP1: 47 kW + j15.61 kVAr
LP2: 2565 kW + j843.06 kVAr
LP3: 289.75 kW + j95.24 kVAr
LP4: 152 kW + j49.96 kVAr
LP5: 517.8 kW + j170.18 kVAr
LP6: 194.8 kW + j64.01 kVAr
B. Energy Storage System
1.1 KV, 125 KWh
C. Generators
DG1: 2 MVA PMSG
Hgen = 0.53, Htur = 4.27, ks = 1.6, Dgen = Dtur = 0
Pp = 32, with 2 MW wind turbine, Tν = 0.1 s
DG2: 2.5 MVA SG
AVR parameters: KA = 400, TA = 0.02
Non-reheat thermal turbine: τT = 450 ms, τG = 80 ms
kT = kG = 1, M = 6, D = 0.03
Control and protection parameters: kc = 3, kd = 40
τν = 0.1, τF = 1, kν = ks = 1
TABLE II
DG2 RELAY SETTINGS - IEEE CATEGORY III PROTECTION RELAY
STANDARDIZED SETTINGS AS IN [39]
Function Default setting Allowable setting limit
OF 62.0 Hz (0.03̇ pu) 66.0 Hz (0.100 pu)
UF 56.5 Hz (0.058 pu) 50.0 Hz (0.167 pu)
ROCOF 3 Hz/s (0.05 pu)
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